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§5.22

Crime-Fraud Exception

Although the attorney-client privilege shields a client’s confidential statements to an attorney
relating to past misconduct, statements seeking the services of the attorney with respect to ongoing
or future crimes or frauds are not privileged. 1 The exception extends even to crimes of a relatively
minor nature. 2 Some authority favors an even broader exception encompassing communications
about ongoing or future conduct that is tortious, whether or not involving crime or fraud. 3
The rationale for this exception is that clients are not entitled to use lawyers to help them in
pursuing unlawful or fraudulent objectives. 4 If the privilege were to cloak such activity, the result
would be loss of public confidence and corruption of the profession. Moreover, when an attorney’s
services are knowingly used to further a crime or fraud, such activity hardly qualifies as
“professional legal services,” an essential element of the privilege. 5 If a client intends to use the
attorney’s services to violate legal obligations rather than comply with the law or vindicate legally
arguable positions, there is no social interest in protecting confidentiality. The future crime-fraud
exception thus marks the boundaries of proper advocacy and ensures an appropriate balance
between the duty to a client and the broader interests of society. 6
Two-part test

§5.22 1. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) (reasons for privilege are “completely
eviscerated when a client consults an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying
out a contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud”). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §82.
2. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085-1086 (9th Cir. 1971) (crime-fraud exception applies to unlawful
possession of grand jury transcript), cert. denied sub nom. Jacobs v. United States, 404 U.S. 958.
3. See Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354 (1985) (citing authorities holding that
privilege “does not shield the disclosure of communications relating to the planning or commission of ongoing
fraud, crimes, and ordinary torts”); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing exception as
applicable to “crime, fraud, or other misconduct”).
4. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (privilege “takes flight if the relation is abused,” and client who
consults attorney for advice that “will serve him in the commission of a fraud” has no protection and “must let the
truth be told”).
5. See §5.11, supra.
6. See generally Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated
Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 443 (1986); Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, the Lawyer’s Obligations of Disclosure, and the Lawyer’s Response to
Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 351 (1986).

The determination whether the crime-fraud exception applies has been held to involve a twopart test:
First, there must be a prima facie showing that the client was engaged in criminal or fraudulent
conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, that he was planning such conduct when he
sought the advice of counsel, or that he committed a crime or fraud subsequent to receiving
the benefit of counsel’s advice. Second, there must be a showing that the attorney’s assistance
was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent activity or was closely related to it.7
The client must know or reasonably be expected to know that the conduct would be criminal or
fraudulent, 8 although the attorney need not be aware of the client’s unlawful purpose. 9 Nor is it
necessary that the attorney actually assist the illegality in any way. 10 The exception does not apply
if the client innocently inquires about a course of conduct she had no reason to know was
unlawful. 11 Nor does it apply even if the client later engages in such conduct pursuant to counsel’s
7. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987). See also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 693 (3d Cir. 2014) (rejecting relaxed “related to” standard; to be “in furtherance” of crime
or fraud, attorney’s advice must advance or client must intend advice to advance his criminal or fraudulent purpose).
8. See Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403-404 (4th Cir. 1999) (party asserting the crime-fraud exception
must make a prima facie showing that (1) client was engaged in or planning criminal or fraudulent scheme when he
sought advice of counsel to further the scheme and (2) documents containing privileged materials bear close
relationship to client’s existing or future scheme to commit crime or fraud), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 891 (1999);
Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (no privilege where there was
sufficient evidence to support conclusion that client “either knew or recklessly disregarded that his wiretapping
activities were illegal”).
9. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 275-276 (3d Cir. 2006) (exception applied to conversations between
attorney and client where client could have been engaged in obstruction of justice, and attorney discussed material
subject to government subpoena, which let client destroy evidence; did not matter whether attorney knew client’s
intent); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503-1504 (9th Cir. 1996) (exception applies even where lawyer “in
the dark” about client’s illegal purpose).
10. In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 157 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (crime-fraud exception may apply even
when the attorney is not “implicated in the crime or fraud” and does not have knowledge of the alleged scheme;
“[a]ll that is necessary is that the client misuse or intend to misuse the attorney’s advice in furtherance of an
improper purpose”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996) (exception applies even if
attorney takes no affirmative step that furthers crime; communication can be “in furtherance” even if it turns out not
to help or even hinders client’s completion of a crime).
11. United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450, 453, 454 (3d Cir. 2005) (privilege is not lost if client innocently proposes
course of conduct and is advised by counsel that it is illegal); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th
Cir. 1996) (not enough for government to show “sneaking suspicion” that client was intending to engage in crime
when consulting attorney, because such a low threshold could discourage would-be clients from consulting attorney
about legitimate legal dilemmas).

erroneous advice that it was lawful. 12 While some courts require that the unlawful intent be
formulated at the time the client solicits the lawyer’s advice, 13 other courts focus on the client’s
intent when consultation is concluded and whether the client was dissuaded from engaging in
illegal conduct. 14
Under the better view, the exception applies to communications about a future crime or fraud
that never occurs, provided the client knew of the illegality and intended to use the attorney’s
advice or services in connection with the crime or fraud. 15 The crime or fraud need not be one
committed by the client to be within the exception. 16 The exception applies even in a proceeding
other than one arising out of the particular crime or fraud that was the subject of the
communication. 17
Examples
The future crime-fraud exception applies to plans to assert a false claim, 18 commit fraud against
12. See ACN, proposed-but-rejected FRE 503(d)(1) (requiring that client “knew or reasonably should have known of
the criminal or fraudulent nature of the act is designed to protect the client who is erroneously advised” that
proposed action is legal).
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 691 (3d Cir. 2014) (for crime-fraud exception to apply,
client must be committing or intending to commit crime or fraud when she consults the attorney; exception “does
not apply where the client forms the intent to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity after the consultation”).
14. United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1986) (client filed fraudulent bankruptcy petition through
services of second attorney after first attorney told him to list recently sold real property; communications between
client and first attorney were not privileged), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109. See also Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers §82 cmt. c (noting that some courts require a finding that the client’s intent was formed at the
time of consultation, but that others “apply the exception despite the absence of proof that the client intended to
commit the illegal act at the time” of the consultation).
15. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996) (crime-fraud exception does not require
completed crime). Contra In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (client must have carried out crime or
fraud).
16. See Matter of Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 900-902 (2d Cir. 1977) (client informed attorney of scheme by others to bribe
a juror; attorney advised client to have nothing to do with it; communications held not privileged because future
crime potentially benefiting client and to which he might be a participant falls within the crime-fraud exception). See
also proposed-but-rejected FRE 503(d)(1) (exception applies where services of lawyer were “sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit” a crime or fraud) (emphasis added).
17. In re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 554-555 (8th Cir. 1980) (exception also applies where communication
is sought in proceeding unrelated to subject of crime or fraud).
18. Whetstone v. Olson, 46 Wash. App. 308, 732 P.2d 159, 162 (1986) (fabrication of sexual harassment claim).

a public agency, 19 kill a witness, 20 bribe a juror, 21 fabricate evidence or commit perjury, 22 conceal
or destroy evidence, 23 file fraudulent documents, 24 and other illegal behavior. 25
Ongoing criminal conduct
The line between past and future (or ongoing) criminal conduct is often hard to draw. 26
Deciding which communication is protected and which is part of an ongoing fraud is particularly
hard in organized economic ventures regulated by complex criminal statutes where a client’s
conduct may be a mix of legitimate and criminal behavior. The most that can be expected of
linedrawing in these areas is that courts will somehow be able to decide that one element
“outweighs” the other and allow protection or require disclosure accordingly, and there is little
doubt that courts will tend to err in requiring disclosure rather than protecting confidences.
Clearly the future crime-fraud exception applies even if disclosure is sought after the
contemplated conduct has occurred, so long as the communication itself looked to future acts.27
19. Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1969) (fraud on patent office).
20. United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 518-519 (4th Cir. 2008) (defendant’s communications in phone call to
attorney from prison were not privileged; they sought advice about murder-for-hire scheme to kill witnesses, hence
fit crime/fraud exception).
21. Matter of Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (plan to commit perjury).
23. See United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (fraudulent noncompliance with grand jury
subpoena); United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1494 (10th Cir. 1984) (privilege does not apply to client’s
statement that he intended to destroy records sought by government), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1157.
24. United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 291-293 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendant was advised by his first attorney of
need to disclose certain transfers in bankruptcy proceeding; defendant then sought services of a second lawyer who
filed petition without making required disclosures), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 461 (1st Cir. 2015) (exception applied where defendant retained
law firm to restructure company in order to misrepresent its true ownership and obtain government contracts);
United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439, 450 (1st Cir. 2012) (communications with attorney evincing intent to use
arson to deprive owners of income to facilitate acquisition of restaurant).
26. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-1029 (5th Cir. 1982) (identity of client
paying legal fees of another falls within the crime-fraud exception where such payment is being made under
agreement that is part of ongoing criminal conspiracy). See generally Stuart, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to
Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 243, 253 (1987) (“The crime of child abuse is both a
continuing and a future crime, as well as a past crime”).
27. State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545 P.2d 901, 903 (1976) (future crime exception applicable where defendant

The exception removes from the privilege only communications that relate to the crime or fraud,
not all prior communications between the lawyer and client. 28
The exception applies even where the plan for the future crime or fraud originated with the
attorney, 29 although under the better view the client must ultimately know and share the purpose
of the wrongful conduct. 30 Contemporaneous illegal conduct involving the client and attorney such
as joint use of drugs does not by itself establish that the attorney-client communications were for
the purposes of committing an ongoing crime or fraud. 31
Establishing the crime-fraud exception
The party seeking production of the allegedly privileged material has the burden of proving
that the exception applies. 32 Although some courts once required the exception to be proved by
“independent evidence,” 33 the Supreme Court held in United States v. Zolin that the allegedly
privileged material can be examined and considered by the trial judge in camera. 34 Thus a
told first attorney he intended to call witnesses to fabricate defense claiming that someone else was driving; on
receiving assurances that perjured testimony would not be used, attorney withdrew; defendant retained another
attorney who successfully defended by using false testimony; client was subsequently prosecuted for perjury; held,
testimony of the first attorney is admissible at the perjury trial).
28. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“the ongoing fraud exception lifts
the attorney-client privilege only with respect to documents relevant to the fraudulent conduct”).
29. See White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1423-1424 (10th Cir. 1990) (in preparing employee for
deposition, corporate attorney advised him to “forget” certain information; such advice is within exception); In re A.
H. Robins Co., Inc., 107 F.R.D. 2, 9-15 (D. Kan. 1985) (corporation and counsel allegedly conspired to conceal
dangerous defects in IUD manufactured by client).
30. Some courts apply what might be more aptly viewed as an “attorney misconduct” exception, where the privilege
is vitiated even where the unlawful intent is solely that of the attorney. See, e.g., In re Impounded Case (Law Firm),
879 F.2d 1211, 1213-1214 (3d Cir. 1989) (exception applies to defeat privilege, even where “pertinent alleged
criminality is solely that of the law firm”; court finds no interest served by permitting attorney to assert “an innocent
client’s privilege with respect to documents tending to show criminal activity by the lawyer”).
31. United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 729-731 (5th Cir. 1986) (use of cocaine by attorney with client does not
establish that communications were in furtherance of illegal activities), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950.
32. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166-167 (3d Cir. 2011) (party asserting crime-fraud exception must make
prima facie showing that client was committing fraud or crime or intended to, and attorney-client communications
were in furtherance of alleged crime or fraud).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944.
34. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566-568 (1989) (FRE 104(a), which generally bars consideration of
privileged evidence when court makes preliminary findings, does not prevent in camera review; until applicability

communication can be found within the exception based on the content of the communication
itself. 35 Indeed, modern cases hold that a trial court must conduct in camera review of otherwise
privileged documents before deciding which ones should be produced under the crime-fraud
exception. 36.
Factual basis
Review of the allegedly privileged material is available, however, only after the party seeking
the evidence has shown a factual basis “ ‘adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person’ that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the
crime-fraud exception applies.” 37 In making the threshold showing necessary for in camera
review, a party may offer any relevant evidence that has been “lawfully obtained” and that has not
already been adjudicated to be privileged. 38
The necessary threshold showing for in camera review may be made ex parte, 39 but may also
be made in an adversarial proceeding. 40 The court may defer in camera review until additional
of crime-fraud exception is resolved, there is “no basis” for regarding the contested evidence as privileged).
35. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 810 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (trial courts may find a prima facie case
of crime-fraud “either by examining privileged material in camera or by examining independent, non-privileged
evidence”). Although Zolin clearly approves in camera review of documents, it is less clear whether the trial judge
may require the attorney or client to testify on the record to the substance of communications between them in this
context, even during in camera proceedings. Doing so would create evidence of the substance of the communication
that did not exist before although the difficulty might be handled by sealing the record in the event the privilege
claim is ultimately sustained and barring use of what is disclosed. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681,
688-689 (3d Cir. 2014) (Zolin standard applies to in camera oral examination of attorney notwithstanding danger of
inaccuracy in “probing the memory of an attorney regarding past communications” because “would-be criminals
could use the differing standards to avoid proper application of the crime-fraud exception” if a heightened standard
applied to communications “never chronicled”).
36. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 810 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2016) (remanding for in camera review
to determine which communications were made in furtherance of intended illegality; agreeing with sister circuits
mandating in camera review to determine the proper scope of a crime-fraud production order).
37. Zolin, supra note 34, at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)). See also United
States v. Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 460 n.3 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for in camera review is “very relaxed” and requires
lesser showing than that needed ultimately to pierce privilege).
38. Zolin, supra note 34, at 575.
39. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1992) (for in camera inspection, trial court has
discretion “to consider only the presentation made by the party challenging the privilege”).
40. United States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2011) (Zolin did not mandate exclusion of one or both parties
from the in camera review of potentially privileged evidence; trial court has discretion to allow adversarial hearing

evidence in support of the crime-fraud exception is produced, and the decision whether to
undertake in camera review is discretionary with the trial court. 41
A judicial decision to conduct in camera review is less of an intrusion on the attorney-client
privilege than ultimate recognition of the crime-fraud exception. For this reason, courts sometimes
allow ex parte determination of the crime-fraud exception in grand jury proceedings. 42 However,
prior to trial or other public disclosure of privileged material based on recognition of the crimefraud exception, the party invoking the privilege should normally be allowed to be heard. 43
Moreover, steps should be taken to preserve the confidentiality of the material until all avenues of
appeal are exhausted. 44
Quantum of evidence
A question not answered by Zolin is the quantum of evidence ultimately required to vitiate the
privilege on grounds of crime or fraud. 45 The traditional rule is that the party seeking the evidence
must make only a prima facie showing of the applicability of the exception. 46 Courts have
on whether crime-fraud exception applies).
41. Zolin, supra note 34, at 572 (court should consider facts and circumstances, including volume of materials to be
reviewed, the relative importance of the alleged privileged information, and “the likelihood that the evidence
produced through in camera review, together with other available evidence then before the court, will establish that
the crime-fraud exception does apply”).
42. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 690 (3d Cir. 2014) (district court did not abuse discretion in
excluding intervenors from in camera interview of attorney to determine application of crime-fraud exception in
grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660-661 (10th Cir. 1998) (showing of
foundation for crime-fraud exception can be made ex parte and court is not required to conduct “minihearing” or
allow rebuttal evidence).
43. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1992) (due process requires that party asserting
privilege “be given the opportunity to be heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking an exception to
the privilege,” although court notes that a different rule may be appropriate in the grand jury context); United States
v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 33 F.3d 342, 352 (4th Cir. 1994) (crime-fraud exception contemplates
possibility that “party asserting the privilege may respond with evidence to explain why vitiating party’s evidence is
not persuasive”).
44. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992) (after crime-fraud exception is found to apply,
allegedly privileged matter should “be kept under seal or appropriate court-imposed privacy procedures until all
avenues of appeal are exhausted”).
45. 491 U.S. at 563 (“[W]e need not decide the quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish the applicability
of the crime-fraud exception.”).
46. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 802 F.3d 57, 65-66 (1st Cir.
2015) (requiring a prima facie showing).

generally held the required showing to be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding of
wrongdoing 47 although other formulations have also been articulated. 48 The prima facie standard
originated in cases where the exception was established by independent evidence without in
camera inspection of the contested material. In cases where that material has been examined in
camera by the trial judge, a preponderance standard should normally be imposed, at least in cases
where the crime or fraud, if any exists, is likely to be revealed by the documents or communications
themselves. 49 Courts are increasingly recognizing, at least in civil cases, that the party seeking to
preserve the privilege should be allowed to respond. 50
Relationship with other doctrines
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege has a complex relationship with
other legal doctrines. There is also an exception to the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality
that covers at least some future crimes or frauds. 51 Each exception has an independent sphere of
operation. 52 If the client’s communication fits the exception to the privilege, the attorney can be

47. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 336-337 (5th Cir. 2005) (for prima facie showing, party invoking
exception must produce evidence that “will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other evidence,” meaning
enough to support a finding if contrary evidence is disregarded; allegations in pleading insufficient); United States v.
Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 459 (1st Cir. 2015) (requiring a prima facie showing to remove privilege, which can be met
by something less than a “more likely than not” standard; reasonable basis sufficient).
48. United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1993) (all that is needed is something “to give color to the
charge” of crime or fraud, and “[w]hether pale or rich or vivid, there is indubitably color here”); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing standards adopted by various courts).
49. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (where court has examined allegedly
privileged documents, information seeker has burden of establishing crime-fraud exception by preponderance of
evidence, not merely by prima facie standard; privilege holder has right to introduce countervailing evidence).
50. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 818 (7th Cir. 2007) (information seeker has initial burden of
production to show that exception has foundation in fact; burden then shifts to privilege claimant to provide
explanation).
51. Compare ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b) (lawyer may reveal confidential information “to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary” (1) “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm” (2) “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another”) with ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4101(C) (lawyer may reveal “intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime”).
52. See generally Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 443, 490 (1986) (finding “a profound theoretical tension between
the view of the attorney-client relationship implicit in the modern law of privilege and the view of the relationship

compelled to make judicial disclosure of the communication, but the ethical duty may continue to
forbid disclosure to others. 53
Helping a client in an unlawful scheme may make the attorney liable as an accessory. 54 The
lawyer may also have civil liability for providing legal assistance to client conduct that is
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful. 55 An attorney could also face civil liability for failure to disclose
certain types of unlawful conduct by a client to regulatory authorities. 56 She might conceivably
face liability for failing to warn prospective victims if the client makes credible threats of assault
or destruction, although the only prominent authority that points in this direction is a famous
California case imposing liability in the very different setting of psychiatric counseling. 57

that underlies the ethical duty of confidentiality”).
53. See Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091
(1985); Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client
Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 332, 362-365 (1976).
54. Matter of Aloi, 141 A.D.2d 270, 534 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1988) (attorney convicted of being an accessory after the fact
for knowingly assisting client to avoid apprehension); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774,
777 (Okla. 1983) (attorney convicted as accessory and suspended from bar for concealing gun on behalf of client).
55. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-1193 (2d Cir. 1974) (attorney sued
along with client for securities violations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998.
56. See generally Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional Responsibility: Suggested
Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 Fordham L.
Rev. 1113, 1138-1142 (1976).
57. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 551 P.2d 334, 353 (1976)
(upholding cause of action against psychotherapists who failed to warn potential murder victim of threats made by a
patient). But see Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §56 (lawyer subject to liability to a client or
nonclient “when a nonlawyer would be in similar circumstances”).

